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ON THE "USEFULNESS" OF SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATIONS
James W. Ellis *
If state action is the paradigm of a "conceptual disaster area"
in constitutional analysis, the system of "tiers" of scrutiny in equal
protection cases must be judged a close second. Justice Marshall's
criticism of the Supreme Court's "rigidified approach"1 has never
been refuted, and the addition of an intermediate tier (or tiers) in
the last decade has failed to dispel the confusion.2 Indeed, the fact
that the Justices insist that identifiable tiers exist but cannot agree
on their number must be a source of doctrinal discomfort.
Nevertheless, some differentiation in the intensity of judicial
scrutiny of challenged legislation seems necessary. The allied principles of majoritarian democracy and judicial restraint require that
courts give substantial deference to most actions of the political
branches of government, while the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment demand more active judicial oversight of some egregious types of discrimination. The only practical approaches are a
sliding scale or a system of categories. Since the Court has nominally rejected the former, we must try to make sense of the tiers.
Since the selection of the applicable tier for a particular case is
usually outcome determinative, much attention has been given to
the selection criteria. For nearly a half century following Carolene
Products3 the appropriate factors were uncontroversial, and debate
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. The author was co-counsel (with
Professor Ruth Luckasson) for the mental disability professional organizations (American
Association on Mental Deficiency, The Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps,
American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Orthopsychiatric Association, American Association of University Affiliated Programs for the Developmentally Disabled, and Council for Exceptional Children) as amici curiae in the
Cleburne case.
This article benefited greatly from the comments on a previous draft by Professors Lee
Teitelbaum, Ann Scales, and Ruth Kovnat.
I. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2. Citations to the body of scholarly criticism of the tiered system would be unduly
burdensome, even for a journal more liberal in such matters than this one.
3. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See Lusky,
Footnote Redux" A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982).
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centered on application of the factors to particular groups. But in
the recent case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,4 the
Court cast doubt on the criteria themselves. The Justices announced, as an additional requirement, a rule of "presumptive irrelevance" of the classification to legitimate governmental
objectives.
The previous (if not "original") understanding held that legislative enactments were subject to more exacting scrutiny if they discriminated against a readily identifiable group that had suffered a
history of invidious discrimination and was powerless, disenfranchised, or substantially disadvantaged in the political arena. 5
Some of the cases also spoke of the immutability of the group's distinguishing trait, the "innocence" of individuals who had not voluntarily selected group membership, and harkening back to Carolene
Products, the discreteness and insularity of the group in society.6
Taken together, these factors roughly indicated the likelihood that
legislators may be motivated by prejudice to treat group members
unfairly.
The issue in Cleburne was the appropriate level of review for
laws that discriminate against people with mental retardation. Applying the traditional tests, the Fifth Circuit had held that heightened scrutiny was warranted. But because mental retardation was a
useful classification for some legitimate legislative purposes, the
court of appeals declined to declare it "suspect" and chose instead
to employ the "middle" tier of scrutiny used in gender cases. Under
this test, the constitutionality of a discriminatory statute depends on
whether it is closely related to an important governmental purpose.
The Supreme Court vacated this part of the Fifth Circuit's
opinion and held that the proper measure for discrimination against
retarded people was the rational basis test. 7 The Court made only a
4. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
5. A typical description was provided by the Rodriquez majority in rejecting a claim of
suspectness:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political processes.
411 U.S. at 28.
6. "In my opinion, the phrase 'discrete and insular' applies to groups that are not
embraced within the bonds of community kinship but are held at arm's length by the group
or groups that possess dominant political power." Lusky, supra note 3, at 1105 n.72.
7. The Court went on to invalidate the zoning ordinance in question by holding that it
did not even meet the minimal test of rationality. The distortion of the rational basis test that
this holding requires, as well as other aspects of Cleburne, are beyond the scope of this article
and shall be reserved for another occasion.
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feeble attempt to argue that mental retardation does not meet the
traditional indicia of suspectness. The principal message of the
Court's opinion is that any form of heightened scrutiny is inappropriate for classifications that reasonable legislators could conscientiously use for legitimate purposes. "Because mental retardation is
a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions,... we will not presume that any
given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not
tolerate."8 Irrelevance to any legitimate legislative purpose is a
prominent feature of those classifications that are deemed suspect.
Indeed, over the years, almost every Justice has rationalized strict
scrutiny by noting that the classification at hand is seldom relevant
to legitimate governmental purposes. 9 However, these references
have always been dicta, and the Court had never before suggested
that the occasional usefulness of a particular classification was dispositive of the level of scrutiny. o The doctrinal news in Cleburne is
that the classification must be presumptively irrelevant to valid legislation before even intermediate scrutiny is justified.
Observations about the frequency with which suspect traits are
irrelevant are a far cry from a rule that presumption of irrelevance
must be established as a prerequisite to careful judicial scrutiny of
8. 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
9. See, eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) ("Classifications treated
as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal."). Interestingly, one of the
earliest references to this concept predates the full development of "tiered" analysis. "'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state of
being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or
color." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
10. The Cleburne majority attempts to persuade that this is not true. Justice White
contends:
[Tihe lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group affected by a law ha.'e
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize
legislative choices as to whether, how and to what extent those interests should be
pursued.
105 S. Ct. at 3255 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976)).
But the Murgia opinion provides no support for this proposition. In that case, the Court
concluded that aged persons did not constitute a suspect class because, historically, they had
not been "subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities." 427 U.S. at 313. The actual lessons of Murgia were that the
absence of a history of invidious discrimination precluded the finding of a suspect class, and
that legislation based on the actual characteristics of a group should not be deemed invidious.
The lesson of Cleburne, by contrast, is that past invidious discrimination against a group
based on "stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their ability" is irrelevant to the
issue of suspectness if some discriminatory laws are based on actual group characteristics.
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discriminatory laws. The case of mental retardation is a good example. Numerous laws treat people with mental retardation differently from people who are mentally typical. Over the years,
legislatures have deemed mental disability to be relevant to such
issues as guardianship, educational placement, public assistance,
and civil commitment. Some of these laws, such as entitlement to
disability benefits and the requirement of appropriate special education opportunities, are based on realistic perceptions of the effects of
mental retardation. Others, such as categorical exclusion from public schools, institutional commitment without a requirement of dangerousness to self or others, and Cleburne's exclusionary zoning
ordinance, are based on false stereotypes. Cleburne teaches that the
existence and legitimacy of the former groups of laws precludes
heightened scrutiny of the latter, even where a substantial likelihood is shown that some such laws are invidiously discriminatory.
Justice Rehnquist has correctly observed that "every classification is relevant to some purposes and irrelevant to others."1 Race
has been found to be usable for remedying some kinds of past discrimination and for implementing constitutional remedies to school
segregation. Gender has been held relevant to conscription and the
definition of statutory rape. Alienage is an acceptable ground for
exclusion from some kinds of government jobs. If the fact that
these classifications are relevant to some constitutionally valid purposes were to preclude heightened scrutiny of all discriminatory
laws affecting these classes, there would be nothing left of the principle embodied in Footnote Four.
The irrelevance of "presumptive irrelevance" can be seen by
considering whether it should be sufficient, in the absence of the
traditional indicia, to warrant heightened scrutiny. Left-handed
people are a minority, and hypothetical laws that might use this
trait as a classifying device would seldom, if ever, be related to rational governmental objectives. Thus "handedness" can be considered, even with greater certainty than race or gender, to be
presumptively irrelevant to legitimate legislative goals. But lefthandedness presents a weak claim under the traditional test for suspect classes. Although left-handedness is a largely immutable characteristic, there has been no history of serious discrimination
against this minority, nor are its members disadvantaged in the
political arena. The political process would surely reject legislative
proposals treating this group unfairly, and should discriminatory
legislation somehow be enacted, a minimal level of judicial scrutiny
would suffice to reject truly irrational discrimination.
11.

Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 42 n. 13 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The device selected for rationing heightened judicial scrutiny
should roughly measure the likelihood that a particular instance of
discrimination against the group in question is invidious. The traditional indicators of suspectness are useful because they show that
discriminatory legislation may be invidious and that the political
branches of government may be disinclined to protect the disfavored group. The Cleburne requirement of presumptive irrelevance
deprives the courts of the means they need to detect unconstitutional discrimination against minorities that have been treated invidiously in the past and are now viewed with residual animosity or
ambivalence by the majority.
Once again, mentally retarded people present a good illustration of the problem. Mental retardation is an immutable characteristic that retarded people do not adopt voluntarily. Their history of
invidious discrimination and oppressive legislation is matched by
few other groups in our society.12 A principal purpose of these laws
was to maintain strict segregation of retarded people from the rest
of society because they were viewed by legislators as a "social menace" (e.g., Utah) and "unfit for citizenship" (Mississippi). Despite
some recent ameliorative efforts, much of this legislation remains on
the books. People with mental retardation are the quintessential
disenfranchished minority: many states bar them from voting by
statute or state constitution, and the nature of their disability prevents substantial political participation even when legal barriers are
removed.
Justice White's efforts to demonstrate that mentally retarded
people do not meet the traditional test for suspectness are unsuccessful. The majority opinion does not even address the history of
invidious discrimination, although this has been a principal focus in
traditional analysis and is probative of the likelihood that discriminatory laws are the result of prejudice. The opinion observes that
there are different degrees of retardation, and thus it is not a completely homogeneous class. But the relevance of this observation is
unclear, since invidious laws have almost invariably discriminated
against retarded people without regard to the severity of their handicap. The majority then declares that it can find no "continuing
12. This history is briefly recounted in Justice Marshall's concurring and dissenting
opinion. 105 S.Ct. at 3266-67. It is noteworthy that five members of the Court described
this history as "grotesque." 105 S.Ct. at 3266 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun); 105 S.
Ct. at 3262 (Stevens and Burger). For a somewhat fuller discussion of the nature of mental
retardation and the history of laws affecting retarded people, see Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally
Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEo. 'WASH. L. RIEv. 414, 416-32 (1985). The amici curiae briefs of the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. and the Association for
Retarded Citizens et al. contain much more detailed historical information, including statutory and historiographical appendices.
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antipathy or prejudice"13 on the part of legislators, and observes
that retarded people should not be viewed as politically powerless.
Justice White's opinion supports these conclusions by noting the
existence of recent federal and state enactments designed to assist
mentally disabled people. But the existence of some beneficial laws
does not preclude the existence of some (old or new) that are based
on stereotyped prejudices. Indeed, the record of the Cleburne zoning controversy stands as irrefutable evidence that such prejudices
endure.14 The Court's attempt to avoid heightened scrutiny by
means of the traditional factors proves too much: applied to groups
already granted special judicial protection it would require a return
to minimal scrutiny. If the fact that advocates have obtained passage of some noninvidious, protective legislation precludes heightened scrutiny, women and racial minorities should now be
consigned to the rational basis test. Similarly, if diversity within a
group negates suspectness, few previously recognized minorities are
entitled to suspect status.
The majority opinion relies more heavily on the new doctrine
of presumptive irrelevance than it does on the traditional considerations for suspectness. This new doctrine is even more central to
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Burger. Justice Stevens, while joining the majority opinion,
renewed his argument that there are not really any tiers at all, but
rather different ways of explaining the application of a single standard of analysis. He once again argued that the rational basis test,
"properly understood," is sufficient to explain even the racial discrimination cases. He acknowledged that "[t]he Court must be especially vigilant in evaluating the rationality of any classification"
that has been traditionally disfavored,15 and goes on to label as
"grotesque" past discrimination against retarded people. But he
also observed that mental retardation is relevant to some legitimate
legislative goals, and therefore concluded that it cannot be said that
all laws employing the classification are presumptively irrational.
Somewhat more puzzling is the reliance Justice Stevens places
on his supposition that some of the laws that disadvantage mentally
retarded people on the basis of relevant criteria could be supported
by a hypothetical legislator who was mentally retarded. If this is
13. 105 S.Ct. at 3256.
14. The Cleburne controversy was illustrative of the irrationality of the opposition to
integration of mentally retarded people, but it lacked the violence that often accompanies
such disputes. See amici curiae brief of American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. at
16 n.25, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985). See generally D.
ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 180-99 (1984).

15.

105 S.Ct. at 3261 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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meant merely to illustrate that some discriminatory laws, unlike the
Cleburne ordinance, are demonstrably rational, it is unexceptionable but not particularly enlightening. If, on the other hand, it is
intended to suggest that a classification cannot warrant heightened
scrutiny when some members of a disadvantaged class could vote
for some discriminatory legislation, larger problems loom. (Readers are requested not to inform Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly that her existence and views are sufficient to overturn the decisions recognizing
gender as a semi-suspect classification).
These concurring Justices supplied the crucial votes for Justice
White's majority opinion.16 It is difficult to know exactly what to
make of the concurrence. While denying the existence of a system
of tiers, it acquiesces in the assignment of an admittedly vulnerable
group to the lowest tier. Perhaps it is to be understood as simply a
refusal to engage in the process of designating tiers (a position more
consistent with the previous opinions of Justice Stevens than those
of the Chief Justice). If so, it lends little support to Justice White's
majority, because the two opinions would merely agree for different
reasons on the rational basis test as the lowest common denominator. If, on the other hand, it is an exercise in tier-assigning under
protest, it represents a stronger commitment to the new presumptive irrelevance doctrine than Justice White's, since the concurrence
does not purport to use the traditional indicators at all.
Perhaps the majority and concurring opinions can best be interpreted as attempts to signal that the era of expansion of heightened scrutiny has ended. Many observers (and perhaps the
Justices) thought this had been accomplished more than a decade
ago in Rodriquez, but some Justices may still be uneasy about the
prospect of other minority groups seeking judicial protection. Justice White's opinion suggests as much when it argues that affirming
the Fifth Circuit's opinion would make it
difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and
the infirm. We are reluctant to set out
17
on that course, and we decline to do so.

That the Court was worried primarily about extending protection to groups other than mentally retarded people is supported by
16. The dissenting Justices reject the idea that presumptive irrelevance is a prerequisite
to heightened scrutiny. 105 S. Ct. at 3270-71 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
17. 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
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the fact that the Court invalidated the statute in question. Indeed,
the discussion of the appropriate tier of analysis, and surely the
transformation of presumptive irrelevance into a prerequisite, were
unnecessary dicta. Having determined that the Cleburne ordinance
could not pass the rational basis test, the majority need not have
ruled on whether any stricter test applied. The fact that the Justices
reached out for the issue suggests that they wanted to send a
message regarding heightened scrutiny: "this far but no further."
It is inconceivable that the Court would apply the Cleburne
doctrine of presumptive irrelevance to classifications previously recognized as suspect or semisuspect. Therefore its importance is for
minorities upon which the Justices have not yet ruled. As the majority opinion noted, a number of these groups exist.
The new rule declares that heightened scrutiny will only be applied to classifications that are rarely relevant to legitimate governmental purposes. Therefore, the rational basis test will apply to
groups that meet the traditional indicators of suspectness but are
deemed relevant to some constitutionally acceptable legislative purposes. This means either that invidious laws will escape careful
scrutiny because of the deference traditionally associated with that
test, or the test will be given new "bite" for these groups. The
Court chose the latter course in Cleburne, and appeared to suggest
that lower courts should do the same in future mental retardation
cases. 18 It gave no indication whether the same approach is to be
followed regarding other groups denied explicit recognition of entitlement to heightened scrutiny. If this approach is to be generally
followed, it creates an unacknowledged fourth tier of analysis, the
contours and requirements of which are unexplained.
The Court's unsatisfactory analysis appears to derive from two
sources. The first may be the Court's concern that the Footnote
Four criteria cannot be given free rein without substantial incursion
into legislative prerogatives. Justice Powell, for example, has
warned that the criteria do not provide a "neat formula for constitutional adjudication," nor do they require judicial intervention on
behalf of "any group that loses a legislative battle."19 The Justices'
resistance to providing a judicial forum for reviewing the merits of
18. The Court cited U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), to illustrate the proper use of the rational basis test.
These are widely recognized as atypically rigorous examples of the test.
19. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1090-92 (1982).
Justice Rehnquist has gone further, arguing that the CaroleneProducts footnote should not
be used to extend strict scrutiny beyond racial minorities, because "[ilt would hardly take
extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete' minorities at every turn in
the road." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

1986]

SUSPECT CLASSES

each political defeat of every minority in our society is understandable.20 The apparent conviction that this consequence can only be
avoided by use of a narrowly restrictive presumption, however,
seems an ill-considered overreaction.
The other source of the Court's difficulty is its failure to acknowledge the consequences of creating more than one level of
heightened scrutiny. In the two-tiered world of equal protection
before Craig v. Boren,21 the Court operated from a strong presumption that the politically accountable branches of government acted
within constitutional bounds; once that deference was abandoned
upon the finding of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the
Court erected an equally formidable presumption against constitutionality. With the new creation of the middle tier(s), the presump-

tion of unconstitutionality is weaker for laws involving quasisuspect classes. The government must assert an important (not
"compelling") interest; however, the relationship between statute
and purpose that must be "close" need not be a perfect fit. But the

Court has failed to elucidate what features characterize a quasi-suspect class or to explain the relationship between such classes and

the nature of intermediate scrutiny. Cleburne added nothing to our
understanding of either issue.
The Court has overlooked the opportunities intermediate scrutiny offers for less "rigidified" analysis than the two-tiered system.
The middle tier can accommodate groups that match the traditional

indicia of suspectness less perfectly than racial minorities
(e.g., women) and those who possess those indicators but whose
characteristics are not presumptively irrelevant to all legitimate
20. Or perhaps part of the Court's concern may be the difficulty in some cases of determining whether an enactment really is a loss for the minority. As in the race and gender
cases, the specters of beneficial legislation and benign discrimination appear to be troubling
the Court. Although cases like Bakke are extraordinarily difficult, there is no reason to introduce their conundrums into the issue of which groups should receive heightened judicial
protection.
Legislation that should survive heightened scrutiny is of two types: beneficial legislation
designed to offset disadvantages that result from past discrimination, and legislation based on
real (rather than stereotypical) differences between groups. The latter is nearly an empty set
for race, but not for mental retardation and other semi-suspect classes. This fact seems particularly troubling for Justice Stevens and the Chief Justice. It may not be perfectly clear
whether such legislation (for example, guardianship for mentally retarded people) is beneficial to the suspect class. Guardianship is beneficial in some cases and disadvantageous in
others. It is inappropriate to focus on whether retarded people are advantaged by the law in
question, because the equal protection clause should not be read to insure that all legislation
will be beneficial. Rather the focus should be on whether the particular legislation is based on
real differences between groups instead of invidious prejudice. Courts should resist the suggestion that heightened scrutiny be employed only when discriminatory legislation disadvantages the suspect class. Cf Note, The Suspect Context: A New Suspect ClassificationDoctrine
for the Mentally Handicapped,26 ARIz. L. Rnv. 205 (1984).
21. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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legislation (e.g., mentally retarded people). For each group,
lawmakers need more latitude than strict scrutiny affords, but the
deference inherent in the rational basis test is incompatible with realistic concerns about the likelihood that legislation may be invidiously discriminatory.
In rejecting intermediate scrutiny, the Cleburne majority expressed concern that "merely requiring the legislature to justify its
efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting at all."22
Shaping constitutional doctrines to accommodate such political
consequences is arguably ultra vires23 and certainly seems ill-advised in this instance. A legislator considering the enactment of
legislation such as the Education For All Handicapped Children
Act (Pub. L. No. 94-142) would hardly be deterred by apprehension
that courts might rule that the legislation was not "closely related
to an important governmental purpose."
Presumptive irrelevance has a useful role to play in equal protection analysis, but it should not be a prerequisite to intermediate
scrutiny. Rather, the Court should first inquire about the likelihood
of invidious discrimination through the use of the traditional indicia
for suspectness. Once the likelihood is found to be substantial, the
existence of legitimate uses of the classification should be a factor in
choosing between "middle tier" analysis and strict scrutiny, and
perhaps in selecting the precise formulation of the intermediate test
for that particular group.
This approach would avoid unwarranted intrusions into the
prerogatives of legislators without ignoring the real possibility of
discrimination against vulnerable minorities. It would also give
lower courts more useful guidance than Cleburne's apparent mandate to use the rational basis test with vaguely sketched variations
in the degree of skepticism judges are to bring to the issue of legislative motives.
Unfortunately, the Cleburne majority left the area of equal protection in worse disarray than it found it. It should reconsider its
approach to those classifications that are useful in some situations
and invidious in others.

22. 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
23. For another example of this practice, see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368
n.17 (1983).

